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The Relationship between Knowledge Intensity 
and Market Concentration in European Industries: 
An inverted U-Shape 
Abstract 
This paper is motivated by the European Union strategy to secure competitiveness for 
Europe in the globalising world by focussing on technological supremacy (the Lisbon-
agenda). Parallel to that, the EU Commission is trying to take a more economic ap-
proach to competition policy in general and anti-trust policy in particular. Our analysis 
tries to establish the relationship between increasing knowledge intensity and the result-
ing market concentration: if the European Union economy is gradually shifting to a pat-
tern of sectoral specialisation that features a bias on knowledge-intensive sectors, then 
this  may  well  have  some  influence  on  market  concentration  and  competition  policy 
would have to adjust not to counterfeit the Lisbon-agenda. Following a review of the 
available theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between knowledge in-
tensity and market structure, we use a larger Eurostat-database to test the shape of this 
relationship. Assuming a causality that runs from knowledge to concentration, we show 
that the relationship between knowledge intensity and market structures is in fact differ-
ent for knowledge intensive industries and we establish a non-linear, inverted U-curve 
shape. 
 
Keywords:  market structure, knowledge intensity, competition policy 
JEL:  L16, L40, O33 
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The Relationship between Knowledge Intensity 
and Market Concentration in European Industries: 
An inverted U-Shape  
Zusammenfassung 
Diese  Arbeit  ist  motiviert  durch  die  Strategie  der  Europäischen  Union,  die  Wettbe-
werbsfähigkeit Europas in der Globalisierung durch eine technologische Vormachtstel-
lung (Lissabon-Agenda), zu sichern. Parallel dazu versucht die EU-Kommission, ihre 
Wettbewerbspolitik an einem stärker ökonomischen Ansatz zu orientieren, insbesondere 
auch die Kartellpolitik. Unsere Analyse untersucht die Beziehung zwischen steigender 
Wissensintensität  und  der  daraus  resultierenden  Marktkonzentration:  Wenn  sich  die 
Wirtschaft der Europäischen Union schrittweise in Richtung einer zunehmenden Wis-
sensintensität verschiebt, dann hat dies Einfluss auf die Marktkonzentration. Die Wett-
bewerbspolitik muß sich dann der Lissabon-Agenda anpassen und darf ihr Ziel nicht 
konterkarieren. Nach einem Literaturüberblick zur theoretischen und empirischen Be-
ziehung zwischen Wissensintensität und Marktstruktur wird mit Hilfe einer umfangrei-
chen Eurostat-Datenbasis getestet, wie sich die Beziehung darstellt. Unter der Kausali-
tätsannahme, dass der Grad an Marktkonzentration durch Wissensintensität bestimmt 
wird, weisen wir eine nichtlineare Beziehung zwischen Wissensintensität und Markt-
struktur in Form einer inversen U-Kurve nach.  
 
Schlagworte:  Marktstruktur, Wissensintensität, Wettbewerbspolitik 
JEL:  L16, L40, O33 
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The Relationship between Knowledge Intensity 
and Market Concentration in European Industries: 
An inverted U-Shape1 
1  Introduction 
The EU has opted for developing a competitive advantage based upon technological su-
premacy in the Lisbon agenda to face the challenges of globalisation. Whilst this implies 
a transformation into a European knowledge-based economy, the question arises as to 
what effect this may have on market structures. In line with what the Austrian School 
suggests, we expect market structures to change with increasing knowledge intensity on 
the supply-side of the economy (Schumpeter-hypothesis). This may be particularly rele-
vant where R&D and eventually innovations depend on tacit knowledge so that techno-
logical advance increasingly requires some form or other of cooperation between firms. 
Where this cooperation occurs between firms in the same industries, this process may 
well lead to market concentration as a result of the augmented knowledge intensity of 
the cooperating firms if the cooperating entities merge (or establish a common devel-
opment-subsidiary). 
As a consequence, the Lisbon agenda of the EU might turn out to necessitate a gradual 
yet distinct change of paradigm for competition policy, which in fact is already taking 
place under the heading ‘more economic approach’, albeit from a different intellectual 
starting point (see e.g. Gual et al., 2005). In our case, this depends on the balance be-
tween concentration effects of increasing knowledge intensity and countervailing effects 
of patent policy. This economic policy question is but a motivation for the following 
analysis, testing the relationship between market structures or market concentration and 
knowledge intensity. We are particularly interested in whether this relationship is dif-
ferent in especially knowledge-intensive sectors of manufacturing industry from more 
traditional sectors. 
We want to test this at the most general level, because we are interested in the general 
relationship between market concentration and knowledge intensity and less so in the 
particular shape of this relationship in individual industries. Further, we are interested in 
                                                 
1  This  report  has  been  prepared  for  the  STREP  project  “Understanding  the  Relationship  between 
Knowledge and Competitiveness in the Enlarging EU”, financially supported by the EU 6
th Frame-
work Programme (contract number CIT5-028519). The authors are solely responsible for the con-
tents, the EU assumes no responsibility for any use that might be made of data appearing in this pub-
lication.  
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the general, time-invariant relationship. In the world of product cycles, we may catch in 
our empirical analysis industries rather randomly in their individual positions of the cy-
cles. This, however, does not provide a problem for our research question but adds to 
the heterogeneity of market structures and knowledge intensities necessary for a robust 
analysis.2 The analysis develops a descriptive taxonomy along the two dimensions of 
knowledge intensity and market concentration by use of data from Eurostat at the three 
digit industrial branch level for manufacturing. This data is then used in a regression 
analysis to find out which proxies for knowledge intensity are significant determinants 
of market concentration, what role the patent system plays for concentration, and what 
shape the relationship between knowledge intensity and market concentration takes for 
knowledge intensive and for more traditional sectors. We hence test the hypothesis that 
market structures of particular sectors are determined to some extent and significantly in 
the statistical sense by sector-specific knowledge intensities. Our macro-focus on indus-
tries is well in line with the result from empirical literature that industry-specific deter-
minants of innovative activity may be more important than firm-specific ones (see Co-
hen and Levin, 1989, pp. 1076-1077 and in particular p. 1088, as well as OECD, 1996 
for comprehensive literature reviews). 
Whilst our regression analysis, by selecting the dependent variable, implicitly assumes a 
particular causality, it is unable to test its direction: the available data does not permit a 
stringent time-series analysis and we hence apply a two-stage least squares estimation of 
simultaneous equations to account for endogeneity between dependent variable (concen-
tration) and determinant variable (knowledge intensity). Also in terms of methodology, 
our reverse causality-case needs some explanation about the sources of knowledge in-
tensity in which mechanisms affect knowledge intensity first and foremost and not mar-
ket structures directly. The literature has come to classify three groups of sources of 
knowledge intensity: demand, technological opportunity, and appropriability conditions. 
The demand-pull concept holds that R&D investments increase with the size and growth 
rate of markets (Schmookler, 1962, 1966) whereas the technological opportunity expla-
nation assumes that industries differ in terms of the intensity of the effect of changes in 
the underlying scientific and technological knowledge on innovative activity (see e.g. 
Scherer, 1967, or with reference to closeness to science and extra-industry sources of 
knowledge in Cohen and Levinthal, 1988). Finally, appropriability conditions, or rather 
the perceived lack of such with a view on the costs of investment in the generation of 
new knowledge, are more of a political issue with patent and copy-right law at its centre. 
 
                                                 
2  In terms of our assumed transition to a knowledge based economy in Europe, we are confronted with 
faster product life cycles driven by technology, i.e. a shorter periods products remain technologically 
idle in their maturing phase. This results in increasing knowledge intensity across the board.  
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2  The reverse causality case 
In the literature, market structure is typically treated as a result of technological deter-
minants like scale economies, sunk costs, product life cycles, market determinants like 
the size of markets, and firm-specific determinants like the effectiveness of managerial 
organisation (including the learning curve) and historical chance (in particular head-
starts of dominant players). What the literature does not focus on very much so far is 
whether market structures may also be determined by the knowledge intensity of the in-
dustry servicing the market. This, however, is an important issue which is at the heart of 
the controversially debated question whether innovative activity is propelled by intense 
competition (low market concentration) or whether an innovator either needs a monop-
oly position or will have to be enabled by patent law to achieve a monopolistic advan-
tage over competitors by innovating. The former results from the traditional Industrial 
Organisation  paradigm  of a one-way causality in the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
concept, pioneered by Joe S. Bain (1956). The latter has older roots and is typically dis-
cussed in the framework of Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative destruction’: here, the 
large body of literature largely focuses on the influence of market structure on innova-
tion,  again  framed  in  the  traditional  Industrial  Organisation-paradigm.  This is hence 
treated as an issue of intellectual property rights regimes in general and the ability of an 
innovator to appropriate the necessary profits to make up for his expenses (sunk costs) 
for innovation-generating research and development in particular. Many years of em-
pirical  testing  produced  rather  ambiguous  results  with  some  establishing  a  positive, 
some a negative relationship, others establishing a positive one (see Cohen and Levin, 
1989, p. 1075 for a literature review). Amongst the most prominent results is that of 
Scherer (1967), suggesting a non-linear ‘inverted-U-shape’ relationship between R&D 
intensity and concentration: R&D intensity first increases with concentration up to a 
maximum of four-firm concentration between 50 and 55 per cent, and declines with 
concentration thereafter. More recently, a seminal article by Aghion et al. (2005) posi-
tively tested an inverted u-shape relationship between product market competition and 
innovation for UK industries and proposes a theoretical explanation of the inverted U: 
focussing on the difference between pre-innovation and post-innovation rents of incum-
bent  firms,  competition  can  foster  innovation  amongst  current  technological  leaders 
whereas the Schumpeterian effect of competition may be dominant amongst laggard 
firms. 
Our matter of interest rather turns around the direction of causality of the Industrial Or-
ganisation-interpretation of Schumpeter and asks whether not market structures are a re-
sult of innovative activity, or more general of knowledge intensity. This effectively re-
verses  the  one-way  causality  of  the  Structure-Conduct-Performance  concept.  Whilst 
ours is today a rather uncommon approach, a redirection of causality has already been 
attempted mainly in the 70s and 80s with the SPRU-institute of the University of Sussex 
probably being the protagonist with the most innovative research in the literature (see  
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e.g. Pavitt, 1984 and Freeman and Soete, 1997 but also Dosi, 1988). This approach has 
recently gained importance in the innovations and market dynamics literature (see Ma-
lerba, 2007) and recognises “that Schumpeter’s insights about the role of innovation in 
determining market structures may be more fundamental than his widely tested hypothe-
sis concerning the feedback from  market structure to innovation incentives” (Levin et 
al., 1985, p. 21). Amongst the more prominent early articles is Phillips (1966) and the 
intuition behind Phillips’ attempt in 1971 termed ‘success breeds success’, is illustrated 
on the example of the civilian aircraft industry. More recently, this direction of causality 
was further tested by Levin (1978 and 1985), Nelson and Winter (1978 and 1982) in a 
simulation  model,  and  Mansfield  (1983)  in  an  empirical  study.  In  a  case  study  by 
Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (1969), the analysis of 61 innovations highlights that 
innovation is typically realised through interactions of firms of different sizes and com-
plementary expertise, etc. In a division of labour, firms cooperate or merge, thereby ac-
quiring all specific knowledge necessary to generate and market innovations. The case 
that innovation requires cooperation of firms within the same industry was assessed in 
the context of licensing by e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Shepard, 1987, Farrell and Gal-
lini, 1988. They state that where the kind of knowledge required assumes tacit and pri-
vate characteristics, it cannot be procured on the market which may eventually produce 
concentration. In Scherer 1976, this causality is motivated by the “erection of strong pa-
tent and know-how barriers” (p. 529) by successfully innovating firms.3 
Probably the closest to our specific matter of interest is the bounds-approach developed 
by Sutton which was positively tested by many empirical analyses, albeit only for spe-
cific and very narrowly defined industries. His approach uses a game-theoretic model-
ling framework to show that seller concentration should increase with R&D-intensity in 
industries characterised by high R&D-efficiency in sales and profit gains, the so-called 
“high-alpha industries”. This, however, only until a certain maximum that effectively 
serves as an upper bound to seller concentration. Technological and demand related fac-
tors lie at the heart of this bound effected by Nash equilibrium on market entry (Sutton, 
1998). 
Very little empirical research is however available in the literature that tests the relation-
ship between knowledge intensity of markets and market structures or dynamics across a 
broader range of industries within the context of our assumed direction of causality.4 
This report attempts to contribute to fill this gap by way of empirical analysis of recent 
                                                 
3  To the best of our knowledge, this strand of research did not play a significant role in empirical re-
search thereafter, apart from particular industry-studies. This may mainly be rooted in the dominant 
interest in academia in the determinants of innovation. 
4  Amongst the most recent survey articles is Malerba (2007) who focuses on the effects of innovation 
on market structures and dynamics. We may take from this survey that the empirical proof that know-
ledge intensity in general is positively associated with concentration is still an unresolved matter. 
This, of course, next to the gaps hat Malerba explicitly lists to lie in the assessment of demand, the 
industry’s type of knowledge-base, and the role of collaboration in R&D for structures.  
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data on European manufacturing industries. It is important to bear in mind that our re-
verse causality-case is more of an issue for general competition policy, not of intellec-
tual property rights regimes only, in as much as policy would have to accept increasing 
concentration on markets in industries that become increasingly more knowledge in-
tense. As a countervailing effect, the intellectual property regime where patent protec-
tion allows innovators to appropriate the costs invested into generating innovations, may 
serve to reduce concentration: in the absence of protection, investors would have to try 
to keep secret where possible the knowledge they generated and try to buy out their in-
dividual knowledge suppliers. Patents and licenses provide instruments to organise this 
on the market, albeit involving transaction costs. On the other hand, however, the patent 
system may also be misused by market participants by erecting barriers to the entry of 
new competitors (patent blocking) or may generate the adverse effect of stifling innova-
tion by effecting a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company 
must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 
2000, p. 119-20).  
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3  Descriptive statistics 
In the following, we present descriptive statistics for concentration and knowledge in-
tensities. For market concentration, the Herfindahl-index is probably the best indicator. 
It is, however, not available for a large number of European countries, or even necessar-
ily comparable across countries due to different methods of calculation. Amongst the al-
ternatives,  literature  suggests  the  use  of  Gini  coefficients  (see  e.g.  Slottje,  2002).  It 
originates from the concept of income distribution and is based on the Lorenz Curve 
which compares the cumulative portion of income earned by the cumulative percentage 
of the population. The Gini coefficient is not influenced by changes in the size of a pop-
ulation, in our application to differences in the number of firms across industries and 
countries.  Furthermore,  in  contrast  to  the  Herfindahl-index,  the  Gini  coefficient  ac-
counts for the observations at the tail end, not just the dominant observations at the top. 
Our Gini coefficient measures concentration in a particular industry on numbers of en-
terprises in the same industry, ranked by firm-size: three-digit NACE-branches of manu-
facturing industries are classified in five labour size classes: (i) one to nine employees 
per firm, (ii) 10 to 19 per firm, (iii) 20 to 49 per firm, (iv) 50 to 249 per firm, and (v) 
250 or more per firm. The coefficient (gini_lab) is calculated according to the formula: 
∑
=
− − + − − =
n
j
j j j j Y Y X X lab gini
1














=∑ .  (1) 
k x denotes the share of enterprises in the five labour size classes ( 1,...,5 k = ) and  k y  the 
corresponding share of employees in each class k. By definition,  0 0 = x  and  0 0 = y . The 
variables in capital letters are cumulative shares. As a measure of concentration, this co- 
efficient can take values from zero  (no concentration)  to almost one: 
n
n 1 −  (full concen- 
centration). Full concentration is when all units (here: employees) are located in one 
class of enterprises and an equal distribution of the variable over all groups denotes no 
concentration. As a source of data that is comparable across European countries, we use 
Eurostat databases. The data-requirement for our analysis is high: first, we need struc-
tural data to calculate our Gini coefficient in a consistent way. Second, in order to con-
trol for potential country-differences by way of dummies, we had to restrict the number 
of countries to prevent country-populations with extremely little data: only countries 
with more than sixty industries with sufficient information to calculate gini_labs were 
included. This reduced the number of countries to 8, down from 25: France is the coun-
try with the largest number of observations with 308 industries included into the analy-
sis, followed by the UK with 159 industries, Germany with 147, Hungary with 116, 
Romania with 90, Finland with 87, Portugal with 78, and Austria with only 66 indus-
tries. 103 three-digit manufacturing industries were considered and data was used from 
the years between 1995 and 2003. The period covered by the data is clearly insufficient 
for a time-series analysis and we hence use the data in a cross-sectional set-up, assuming  
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that the structure between knowledge intensity and concentration will not have changed 
between 1995 and 2003. Deducting missing values, this provided us with a total of 1051 
cases in an unbalanced, cross-sectional sample. This significant number of cases allows 
us to conduct meaningful statistical and econometric analyses. The German sample uses 
the Herfindahl-index, here the number of cases is much lower with 327 cases. In the in-
terpretation of results, we treat our analysis of Germany by use of the Herfindahl-Index 
as a test of the quality of our gini_lab indicator. 
Knowledge intensities are proxied as is common in the literature by expenditure for 
R&D per turnover (exprd) and the share of labour employed for R&D (labrd). Finally, 
we devise an interaction term between exprd and labrd to identify those industries that 
simultaneously intensively spend on R&D and employ labour for R&D (knowl).5 To 
improve readability in the presentation of the data, we grouped industries into classes 
with homogeneous characteristics that have some relationship with our issues of interest 
(concentration and knowledge intensity). 
3.1  The raw data and test of variables 
The following descriptive Table 1 on patents per labour, labour employed in R&D ac-
tivities, and expenditure in R&D is presented in manufacturing classes of the WIFO 
taxonomy (Peneder, 2002). Here, manufacturing industries are grouped into overlap-free 
classes with homogeneous characteristics that have some relationship to our issue of in-
terest, i.e. knowledge intensity. This provides us with some indication as to which of the 
three indicators derived from the literature are statistically close proxies of knowledge 
intensity. In fact, all indicators exhibit the highest means in industries classified as tech-
nology driven, lending some support to our knowledge-intensity indicators. 
We may further expect above-average knowledge intensities in capital intensive sectors, 
as here we can assume complementarity between knowledge intensity and high capital 
expenditure. Yet, only for the indicator of labour employed in R&D is the class of capi-
tal intensive industries ranked second in terms of knowledge intensities: for expendi-
tures in R&D, main manufacturing industries are ranked considerably higher than capi-
tal intensive sectors, and this hints to us that our exprd indicator may not be sufficiently 
industry-specific. In particular, we cannot tell from the aggregated data whether R&D 
expenditure in a particular industry is targeted at this very industry or whether this rather 
takes the form of R&D services by way of outsourcing. 
                                                 
5  Whilst this interaction terms may seem at first sight rather futile, as labrd and exprd will be highly 
correlated, each of the two individually is riddled with particular problems: explicit R&D spending 
may be difficult to measure in some industries whereas in others, employment for R&D only may be 
a difficult category. An interaction term hence helps to even out those industry-specific difficulties: 
fulfilling both criteria at the same time is the stricter version of a proxy and reflects the complementa-
ry character of expenditure and personnel.  
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All those stylised facts are somewhat weak, due to the fact that the numbers of observa-
tion are sometimes quite low, and variances in the distributions of indices frequently 
quite high (assuming a level of standard deviation per mean below one would signify 
sufficiently  low  variance). A comparison of minimum and maximum levels and the 
means show that the distributions are typically skewed with a bias to the left and a long 
tail to the right. 
Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics for knowledge intensity indicators in classes of manufacturing 
labrd in %  N  Min  Max  Mean  Standard dev / mean 
Capital intensive  87  0  10.118  2.027  1.086 
Labour intensive  253  0  7.431  0.712  2.016 
Marketing driven industries  252  0  9.278  0.718  1.888 
Main manufacturing  304  0  42.076  1.558  1.850 
Technology driven industries  155  0  27.068  6.511  0.840 
exprd in %           
Capital intensive  87  0  4.757  0.700  1.384 
Labour intensive  253  0  4.359  0.389  2.139 
Marketing driven industries  252  0  8.108  0.319  2.471 
Main manufacturing  304  0  25.126  0.868  2.427 
Technology driven industries  155  0  15.797  3.232  0.980 
knowl in %           
Capital intensive  87  0  0.481  0.034  2.565 
Labour intensive  253  0  0.309  0.014  3.630 
Marketing driven industries  252  0  0.576  0.011  4.727 
Main manufacturing  304  0  9.715  0.068  8.971 
Technology driven industries  155  0  4.276  0.365  1.588 
Source:  Raw data from Eurostat, own calculations, classification by use of Peneder 2002. 
The following Tables 2 and 3 provide a picture of levels of concentration in the five 
classes of manufacturing. The first table refers to the data we use in our main part of the 
analysis and the second table mirrors these descriptive statistics by use of German data. 
Here, we can consistently use a Herfindahl-index and compare the results with our own 
indicator for market-concentration. In a first view on the tables, the descriptive analysis 
already suggests that particularly knowledge-intensive sectors of manufacturing indus-
try, here classified as technology-driven industries, appear to have a higher mean value 
of market concentration. This applies to the European data, proxied by our gini_lab co-
efficient, and is particularly obvious for the Herfindahl-indices for Germany. 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive statistics for the concentration indicator in classes of European manufacturing 
gini_lab  N  Min  Max  Mean  Standard dev / mean 
Capital intensive  318  0.000  0.908  0.699  0.304 
Labour intensive  907  0.000  0.931  0.612  0.303 
Marketing driven industries  875  0.000  0.945  0.653  0.301 
Main manufacturing  993  0.000  0.945  0.702  0.232 
Technology driven industries  441  0.000  0.944  0.729  0.259 
Source:  Raw data from Eurostat, own calculations, classification by use of Peneder 2002. 
Table 3: 
Descriptive statistics for the concentration indicator in classes of German manufacturing 
HHI(4)  N  Min  Max  Mean  Standard dev / mean 
Capital intensive  121  20.040  553.04  154.52  0.624 
Labour intensive  215  3.870  311.55  59.16  1.075 
Marketing driven industries  269  4.526  557.15  94.68  1.052 
Main manufacturing  320  7.715  650.17  94.76  1.247 
Technology driven industries  88  11.560  477.25  160.61  0.792 
Source:  Monopolkommission, own calculations, classification by use of Peneder 2002. 
Capital intensive industries also show a rather high concentration level which may be 
rooted in large capital-related fixed costs and entry and exit barriers. Further, we would 
expect labour intensive industries to have comparatively lower concentration and this is 
well reflected by our data in both table. In particular for the European data, these results 
appear to be robust with a high number of observations and a low variance in the distri-
bution of indices.6 Finally, these results suggest that our gini_lab indicator appears to 
roughly produce the same results as the more precise Herfindahl indicator: rankings be-
tween the two indicators only differ between capital intensive sectors and main manu-
facturing but remain consistent for all other groups. This lends support to our own indi-
cator and we may hence focus our following analysis on the gini_lab indicator. 
3.2  The taxonomy of knowledge intensity and market concentration 
Whilst the descriptive statistics of the raw data already gave some indication that the 
level of market concentration appears to be higher in groups of industries that are rather 
knowledge intensive and lower for more traditional industries, the comparison of means 
                                                 
6  The low variances for the gini_lab indices in comparison to the ones for the HHI(4) are due to the 
definition of this coefficient between 0 and 1 and means of higher than 0.6. This means that higher 
variances are mathematically not possible. The high variance in the German data is due to the fact 
that the distribution is skewed with a bias to the left and a long tail to the right.  
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over industry groups is still a quite rough guide. In the following next step, we provide a 
graphical picture of the relationship between knowledge intensity and market concentra-
tion over all industries and countries we were able to collect data for (Figure 1). The 
figures plot all industries of all countries included in the analysis in a two-dimensional 
space  between  gini_lab  and  all  our  three  indicators  for  knowledge  intensity,  exprd, 
labrd, and knowl, in turn. 
We can hardly detect any clear relationship in any of the three figures. In general, howe-
ver, we find that knowledge intensive industries tend towards the high-concentration 
space and rarely appear in the lower part of the figure (low concentration). 
In a further attempt to describe the relationship of our interest, we rank the three-digit 
industries according to concentration and knowledge intensities to see whether indus-
tries ranking high in terms of concentration also rank high with respect to knowledge in-
tensity. First, however, we test whether our three indicators for knowledge intensity of-
fer a roughly consistent industry ranking across countries and time. Here, we report the 
results of the highest and lowest percentiles: in fact, the food processing, textile manu-
facturing, manufacturing of wood and wood products, non-metallic mineral products, 
fabricated metal products, and furniture manufacturing industries ranked consistently in 
the lowest percentile for all three knowledge intensity-indicators; the highest knowl-
edge-intensive percentile was typically occupied by industries belonging to the manufac-
turing of chemicals and chemical products, of office machinery and computers, of elec-
trical machinery, of radio, TV, communication equipment, and of medical, precision and 
optical instruments, as well as watches for all three indicators of knowledge intensity. 
These rankings suggest that our indicators offer a consistent picture across industries 
and that industry-specifics are more important than country-specific (or time-specific) 
effects. With respect to concentration, the results are similarly consistent. In the second 
step, the comparison of industries occupying the highest percentiles for both knowledge 
and concentration shows strong overlaps: knowledge intensive industries typically rank 
amongst the highest-concentration percentile and industries with low knowledge intensi-
ties rank amongst the lowest concentration percentile. Yet, some important differences 
emerge: whilst industries like the manufacturing of medical, precision and optical in-
struments, and watches belong to the knowledge-intensive industries according to our 
rankings, these industries frequently appear in the low-concentration percentile-ranking. 
Also, some of the food processing industries appear very low in the concentration rank-
ing whilst at the same time, other food processing industries turn out to be ranked at the 
highest levels of concentration. All other ranks are occupied by the same industries be-
tween knowledge intensity and market concentration. This already suggests to us that 
there probably is a strong relationship between knowledge and concentration which, 
however, might not be a linear one at all. 
 
Figure 1:  
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Source:  Raw data from Eurostat, own calculations.  
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To give a picture of what European industries rank highest in both criteria, knowledge 
and concentration at the same time, we count the frequencies that individual industries 
appear in the highest percentile in our database over countries and time: the higher the 
frequency of appearance, the more robust is their characterisation as typically knowl-
edge intensive and at the same time highly concentrated. The five industries with the 
highest frequency is manufacture of office machinery and computers with 11 occur-
rences, of domestic appliances (10), of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy (9), of electricity distribution and control appara-
tus (8), and manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, 
perfumes and toilet preparations with 7 occurrences.  
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4  Regression analysis 
After having reviewed the raw data in a descriptive analysis, we now turn to testing eco-
nometrically the principle interest of this paper which is the relationship between know-
ledge intensity and market concentration. In accordance with our implicit assumption 
that market structures may be determined by knowledge intensities, we use our concen-
tration coefficients of gini_lab for the EU as endogenous variable in our explorative re-
gression models.7 Following the insights from related empirical research and theoretical 
discussions on the subject matter, we include industry-specific determinants in our anal-
ysis. In line with Scherer’s 1967 findings that concentration as determinant of innova-
tion becomes ever more significant as the analysis accounts for industry-characteristics 
of technology, we control for typical occupational skill levels of employees in the indus-
tries by use of dummies for three industry-classes (see also Scott, 1984, where a simple 
classification of industries into technology groups explains a substantial fraction of vari-
ance in R&D intensity). Next, we test for the influence of each industry’s extent of ver-
tical integration of production: this reflects the observation that market concentration of 
an industry may increase in some industries the more its firms integrate vertically (con-
trol over up- and downstream markets), whilst vertical integration may in other indus-
tries adversely affect economies of scale where firms size becomes a delimiter of effi-
ciency. 
Further, we include the degree of closeness or national/regional concentration of indi-
vidual industries. This tests the hypothesis that intensity of competition increases with 
import competition (corresponding to a low degree of closeness and a high degree of 
openness) whilst industries servicing mainly national/regional markets can be assumed 
to be rather concentrated. Finally, country dummies were included to control for pos-
sible country-specific effects. The regression model reads in its theoretical (or rather 
conceptual) form: 
Concentration = f (knowledge intensity, vertical integration, closeness from external 
markets (or domestic market share in EU25 market), Dskills, Dcountries) 
As  proxies  for  knowledge  intensity,  the  ratio  of  expenditures  in  R&D  per  turnover 
(exprd), labour in R&D per overall labour (labrd), and their interaction term (knowl) 
which assumes that expenditures in R&D and labour in R&D are complementary, so 
that the effect of knowledge intensity on market structures will be particularly strong 
where both expenditures and personnel in R&D is invested at the same time. These 
three alternative variables are treated as exogenous in our regression analysis. Vertical 
integration is measured by the share of each industry’s gross value added in the total 
                                                 
7  Here, we do not further consider the German case, because the number of observations are really too 
low to warrant the use of a regression analysis. The previous analysis, however, may suffice to show 
that our gini_lab indicator may well be used to proxy concentration.  
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value of production (verti). Closeness is proxied by the individual industries’ share of 
domestic turnover in total turnover of the whole region of EU25 (close), assuming that 
the European common market is typically the most important market to engage in for 
European producers. Further, we test for the influence of the intellectual property right 
regime  by  way  of  patenting  intensity  of  industries.  Finally,  we  control  for  country-
specific and for industry-specific factors by way of dummies. The latter are skill-based 
dummy variables skill_bc (medium skill/blue collar), skill_wc (medium skill/white col-
lar) and skill_high (high skill) and are calculated by use of the New WIFO taxonomy of 
Peneder (2002). Because the class of industries with typically low skilled employees is 
by far the largest, we use this class as reference dummy. 
Due to the fact that this regression model is rather explorative in nature, we first test our 
indicators for possible correlations amongst the explanatory variables and for a first in-
dication of relationship between concentration and our set of indicators for knowledge 
intensity. The correlation matrix of Table 4 shows that only in the cases between two of 
our alternative knowledge-indicators exprd and labrd as well as between them and the 
amalgamation term of knowl produce significant and high correlations. The correlation 
coefficients all amount to around 0.9, whereas the other significant correlations all re-
main below 0.4. We can hence assume independence between the alternative independ-
ent variables for our regression analysis. With regard to the relationship between our de-
pendent  variable  gini_lab  and  the  proxies  for  knowledge  intensity  exprd,  labrd,  or 
knowl, we find that correlation coefficients are significant and weak with levels of be-
tween 0.25 and 0.35 only. Our proxy for the intellectual property rights regime, paten, 
exhibits a negative correlation with our concentration measure, suggesting that concen-
tration is lower in three-digit industries with a high patent intensity. This results, if it 
holds in our regression analysis, is not at all counter-intuitive: patents are not only an in-
strument to protect generated knowledge, but also imply that the new knowledge be 
published. In particular in narrow or oligopolistic markets, enterprises tend to behave 
strategically and may prefer to keep their new knowledge undisclosed to competitors. 
Lacking a coherent model suggesting a clear one-way causality between market struc-
tures (concentration) and knowledge intensity, a regression analysis may be riddled with 
an endogeneity-problem between the dependant and independant variables. We hence, 
as a first step, use a two-stage least squares estimation of simultaneous equations.8 This 
analysis tells us that an assumed direction of causality of market structures as depending 
on knowledge intensities can in fact be supported by the data. The other direction of 
causality treating knowledge intensity as dependent variable, however, could not be con-
firmed. This allows us to assume that a regression analysis explaining market structures 
through knowledge intensity has no endogeneity-problem – we proceed with the main 
                                                 
8  The two-stage regression assumes two simultaneous relationships: the relationship treating concentra-
tion as depending on knowledge intensity uses vertical integration as its exclusive parameter, the op-
posite causality is tested with closeness as exclusive parameter.  
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regression analyses inferring the shape of the above relationship and the influence of 
other  determinants  like  patents,  vertical  integration,  closeness  (or  share  of  domestic 
market in EU25 markets), industry and country specifics. In the cross-sectional analysis, 
a set of four regression models are tested. The significance tests are defined at the 5 per 
cent level and we use the original values of our variables (not logs), because we assume 
an additive relationship between the determinants of market structure.9 The dependent 
variable is in fact defined between 0 and 1, i.e. left and right censored, so we first use 
tobit-specifications for our regressions. The results of OLS-regressions, however, are 
nearly the same, differences emerge only at the 10 per cent level for p-values, whereas 
all  coefficients  and  signs  remain  unchanged.  We  hence  report  the  results  of  OLS-
regressions, because here, more regression diagnostics are available to test the robust-
ness of our models. 
Table 4: 
Correlation Matrix of variables used in the regression analysis 
 
gini_lab  exprd  labrd  knowl  paten  verti 
exprd  0.3159 
(0.000) 
1039 
      - Correlation coefficient 
  - (Significance) 
  - Observations 






       









     












   


































Source:  Raw data from Eurostat, own calculations. 
Model 1 uses exprd, Model 2 labrd, Model 3 knowl. Ideally, all three models should al-
so test for the influence of the intellectual property regime, but because of the low num-
ber of observations in patenting intensity of industries, we tested models with and with-
out the variable paten and report in Model 4 the results of the model that includes paten, 
                                                 
9  A production-function-type of relationship would imply that with any of the independent variables 
assuming a value of 0, market concentration would also have to be 0 (i.e. no concentration or maxi-
mum polypolistic markets). This, however, is rather counter-intuitive, because a market where firms 
do not engage in R&D at all will not necessarily exist in an atomic market structure.   
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even if the number of observations drops at an order of magnitude. In order to account 
for the possibility of non-linear relationships, the regression models were first tested be-
tween the dependent variable and increasing powers of our alternative proxies for know-
ledge intensity without the inclusion of the other independent variables or dummies. 
This tests for possible non-linear relationships between concentration and knowledge in-
tensity of our three-digit manufacturing industries and is prompted by the assumption in 
the literature that the neo-Schumpeterian influence of market structures on firms’ pro-
pensity to innovate may well be of an inverted U-shape. Pioneered by Scherer (1967), 
this forms part of most empirical work on this topic thereafter (see e.g. Lima, 1999). For 
exprd, labrd, and knowl, these test regressions establish that adding squared terms in-
creases r-squares without generating new problems. For paten, the test for non-linearity 
does not suggest the use of a squared term. Further non-linearities for the other inde-
pendent variables are not assumed. The resulting empirical formula hence read: 
= lab gini_ + + + + + close verti rd rd c 4 3
2
2 1 exp exp β β β β  
Country D hi skill wc skill bc skill 14 8 7 6 5 _ _ _ − + + + + β β β β   (Model 1) 
= lab gini_ + + + + + close verti labrd labrd c 4 3
2
2 1 β β β β  
Country D hi skill wc skill bc skill 14 8 7 6 5 _ _ _ − + + + + β β β β   (Model 2) 
= lab gini_
2
1 2 3 4 c knowl knowl verti close β β β β + + + + + 
Country D hi skill wc skill bc skill 14 8 7 6 5 _ _ _ − + + + + β β β β   (Model 3) 
= lab gini_
2
1 2 3 4 5 c knowl knowl paten verti close β β β β β + + + + + + 
6 7 8 9 15 _ _ _ Country skill bc skill wc skill hi D β β β β − + + + +   (Model 4) 
In the absence of an explicit structural model describing the general mechanisms deter-
mining the relationship between increasing knowledge intensity and market concentra-
tion, prior expectations about signs of the specialisation vs diversification and the rela-
tive market size variables remain ambiguous, we apply the two-sided test for signifi-
cance (at the 5 per cent level). All models appear to be jointly significant with f-tests 
exceeding  critical  values  (see  Table  5).  Model  1,  however,  fails  the  Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, hence the use of White’s robust stan-
dard errors in this model. Further attempts to improve the specification of Model 1 by 
use  of  interaction  terms did not produce positive results. Model 2 produces slightly 
higher r-squares and does not appear to have a heteroskedasticity-problem in residuals, 
yet only considers R&D-labour and neglects the complementary expenditures for R&D. 
Model 3 uses the interaction term between R&D-labour and R&D-expenses and also 
passes  all  tests  and  
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can hence be further interpreted. The inverted U-shape is tested positively10, i.e. concen-
tration increases with knowledge intensity and at very high levels tends to fall again. 
The industry branches of the new economy might drive this result: here, competition in-
tensity is quite high with a large number of new firms entering the markets quickly due 
to low set-up (sunk) costs. At the same time, this industry will report particularly high 
shares of R&D expenditure and R&D personnel. 
Figure 2: 
















This particular non-linear relationship can furthermore be exhibited by use of a graph 
(Figure 2): assuming all other determinants of market structure remaining the same (ce-
teris paribus), the relationship between our concentration indicator (gini_lab) and our 
amalgamated proxy for knowledge intensity (knowl) is plotted in a two-dimensional di-
agramme. The marks in the figure represent the original values for our indicators and the 
line  represents  the  hypothetical  values  that  result  from  the  regression  (note  that  the 
shape of the lines are strictly hypothetical). Admittedly, the far right hand side of the in-
verted U-shape is rather weak with only a few observations. Continuously removing ob-
servations from the right margin in the regression, however, still produces a significant 
                                                 
10   In fact, the linear version of this regression model also results in a positive and significant coefficient 
for our knowledge intensity proxies, so that the results of the non-linear models that include the 
squared term can be interpreted as containing additional and still consistent information.   
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U-shape in the regression and the slope of the hypothetical curve; we have tested this for 
a level of 0.001, which clearly excludes observations outside the bulk. 
In Model 4, adding our variable for the influence of the intellectual property rights re-
gime exemplarily for our amalgamated knowledge intensity proxy, the number of obser-
vations is critically low. Never-the-less, the regression model appears to be consistent 
with even higher r-squares and no heteroskedasticity-problem. Only four determinants 
turn out to be significant with paten receiving a significant negative sign. Still, this 
model passes all tests and produces the highest r-squares, albeit not at an order of mag-
nitude. We may conclude from this model that where firms prefer not to use patents, 
market  structures  become  increasingly  concentrated  (because  of  the  secrecy-
implications). This is in fact in line with the conclusion that “there is even less evidence 
of  a  positive  relationship  between  innovative  output  and  market  structure”  (OECD, 
1996, p. 16). 
In regard to our testing for the influence of vertical integration and closeness or na-
tional/regional market share in EU25 markets, Models 1 through 3 consistently tell us 
that both determinants are in fact significant and that market concentration tends to fall 
with  increasing  levels  of  vertical  integration  (proxied  by  verti)  and  with  increasing 
openness to foreign (European) markets (proxied by close): it may not be surprising that 
industries with high levels of vertical integration will contain firms that are predomi-
nantly highly specialised and that these will tend to operate in rather polypolistic mar-
kets, each seeking their market share via varieties of niche-products. What is even more, 
vertical integration reduces the potentials for scale economies, and the traded literature 
of industrial organisation holds that concentration typically rises with increasing scale 
economies.  The  positive  relationship  between  closeness  or  national/regional  market 
share in EU25 markets and market concentration may also be plausibly motivated by the 
assumption that industries that operate at the national/regional level have little competi-
tion from foreign (EU25) markets. 
The regression models additionally control for country and occupational skills effects. 
Only in Model 3 do skills-dummies turn out to be significant with lower skill-intensities 
tending to be negatively related to concentration and higher skill-intensities positively. 
This lends further support to our result that concentration appears to increase with in-
creasing knowledge intensity (that is, if not accounting for very highly knowledge inten-
sive industries). The results for the country-dummies are more frequently significant 
than not, and typically, Western countries have a negative coefficient whereas Hungary 
and Romania as our two examples for Eastern post-transition countries have a positive 
sign. A further test not reported here involving data for our Eastern post-transition coun-
tries Romania and Hungary only does not contradict the qualitative results, albeit with 
frequent insignificancies (and much lower numbers of observation). We hence do not 
expect that the relationship between knowledge intensity and market concentration is 
different in post-socialist economies.  
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5  Conclusions 
If the results generated in our taxonomy and our regression models are in fact trustwor-
thy, we may conclude that in fact market structures appear to depend on knowledge in-
tensity of the industries involved: concentration appears to rise with increasing knowl-
edge intensity; very high knowledge intensity then appears to relate to moderating levels 
of concentration (which, however, may be a particular effect rooted in the new econ-
omy-phenomenon). We could have controlled for or tested more determinants of market 
structure, but because the results for determinants that we are mainly interested in, i.e. 
knowledge intensities, remain robust with or without the inclusion of the determinants 
and dummies we did add, we can be fairly sure about the final conclusion. 
The implications of these results for competition policy raise the question as to how 
competition policy should treat concentration and cooperation between firms in particu-
larly knowledge-intensive sectors? Or in a more dynamic version: should competition 
policy try to stem concentration tendencies, if those result from a transition to a higher 
knowledge intensity of the industry involved? We have learned from a vast body of re-
lated research that an industry’s technological opportunity is affected by the contribution 
of technical knowledge from sources external to the industry like suppliers, customers, 
universities, technical societies, government, and independent inventors (for a review on 
this literature, see Cohn and Levin, 1989, p. 1088). If hence technological development 
in general or innovation in particular depend on cooperation between firms via mergers, 
collaborative R&D and innovation activities, then some concentration will be a good 
thing and a strict per-se legal treatment of competition cases will not allow the economy 
to reap full benefits from its potentials for technological advance via R&D and innova-
tion.11 
The novelty of this paper lies in its competition policy motivation of an analysis that has 
been largely overlooked by the profession. Albeit, with the EU economic area increas-
ingly becoming more knowledge intensive in the process of globalisation, the effects on 
market structure and concentration become increasingly important for competition pol-
icy. This parallels the call for a ‘more economic’ approach for competition policy. In the 
latter, the focus is on the determinants of innovation motivated by a more dynamic view 
of competition as an engine for the efficient allocation of resources. Our analysis and re-
sults  hence  complement  this  call  and  lend further support for a more economic ap-
proach, albeit from a different intellectual starting point. 
                                                 
11  On the other side, however, if the rule-of-reason is but an unclear and non-transparent vehicle treat-
ing each case according to criteria unknown to the actors at large, then legal uncertainty will perhaps 
even more prevent technological advance by preventing cooperation that is not only economically but 
also legally risky. This, however, should be subject to another piece of research.  
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